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Abstract—“Moving fast, and breaking things”, instead of “being safe
and secure”, is the credo of the IT industry. In this paper, we take a
look at how we keep falling for the same security issues, and what we
can learn from aviation safety to learn building and operating IT systems
securely. We find that computer security should adopt the idea of safety.
This entails not only building systems that are operating as desired
in the presence of an active attacker, but also building them in a way
that they remain secure and operational in the presence of any failure.
Furthermore, we propose a ‘clean slate policy design’ to counter the
current state of verbose, hardly followed best practices, together with an
incident handling and reporting structure similar to that found in aviation
safety.
1 INTRODUCTION
In modern IT engineering, we like to believe that rapid
development cycles are the only path to innovation, and
readily accept the occasional failure while doing so [15]. In
the minds of IT engineers and managers alike, this trade-off
seems reasonable: After all, what is the harm of occasional
failure? Our systems are dynamic, come with a full Con-
tinuous Integration/Continuous Delivery (CI/CD) pipeline,
and a patch can be quickly deployed, making progress in the
course of it. Ultimately, it is not like lives depend on it, we
tell ourselves.
However, the recent past has dramatically grounded this
believe. We saw people lose their freedom and live due
to sloppy security choices in dating apps [3]. We are still
unable to grasp the true impact hundreds of millions of
records exposed in data-breaches will have on the affected
customers [6]. We saw planes crash, due to errors and faulty
trade-offs all too familiar to IT engineers.
What all these incidents have in common is that they
would have been preventable. They are cases of operational
misconfigurations, and simple misengineering that ignores
best current practices. Even worse, the mechanics underly-
ing these incidents are known for years and decades [2].
To preserve and improve the security of information
systems, various governance advances have been made to
introduce regulation, processes and standardization. Exam-
ples are ISO27001, Common Criteria certification, and, most
recently the European General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR). Nevertheless, when we take a look at organizations
security posture, we find that these regulations did not
have the envisioned practical impact. For examples, Equifax
lost over hundred million individual data records due to a
simple security blunder, while being ISO27001 certified [6].
In fact, in a recent publication Dietrich et al. [2] find, that
root-causes for security incidents in organizations are often
not technical, but in fact institutional issues.
In this article, we compare our observations on the
current state of computer security with the early state of
aviation safety, and find that they are comparable. Based on
this, we explore how and which governance levers could
be adopted from the history of aviation safety to make IT
systems more secure.
Our core-recommendations are:
• Including the notion of a system’s safety into threat
models.
• Developing a common ‘clean-slate’ best practices
repository, by adding actionable practices based on
what would have prevented investigated incidents.
• Conducting public investigations of (major) IT se-
curity incidents, and feeding the results back to the
best-practices repository.
• Delegating regulatory and investigative authority for
IT security incidents to a tree-formed structure of en-
forcement bodies, leveraging existing CSIRTs, under
an international umbrella organization.
• Reshaping the incentive-structure of computer secu-
rity, by introducing fines that are initially low, but
double for each repeated violation of guidelines from
the global best-practices repository, to not inhibit
innovation.
Structure: We discuss current examples of (repeated) com-
puter security incidents in Section 2, and compare to the
development of aviation safety in Section 3. Based on this
comparison, we assess practices from aviation safety and
how these techniques may be beneficial to computer secu-
rity in Section 4. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
2 HOW COMPUTER SECURITY FAILS
The underlying premise of this paper is that computer secu-
rity usually fails in preventable ways. However, especially in
hindsight, everything can be considered preventable. Hence,
to define preventable incidents, we first take a look at what
we consider non-preventable incidents.
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In general, non-preventable vulnerabilities include novel
complex attack opportunities, and new-found non-operational
vulnerabilities and exploits. More to the point, every attack
enabled by an 0-day, i.e., a vulnerability for which no mitiga-
tion is available, can be considered–at first–non-preventable.
A good example for such an attack is the 2011 case of
Northrop Grumman. In brief, state-level attackers utilized
an 0-day in Adobe client software to breach the RSA Cor-
poration, cloned an RSA 2-factor authentication token, and
used that token to subsequently breach the defense contrac-
tor Northrop Grumman. Of course, the attack could have
been technically preventable, e.g., if clerk whose machine
at RSA was initially infected had not opened the malicious
attachment. However, given the circumstances, no actor on
the victims’ side could have reasonably acted differently.
It is the clerks job to read external communication, and
lateral movement in networks using further 0-days is hardly
containable.
In contrast to this, preventable security incidents are those
where the attack could have been prevented all together,
or the impact could have been significantly reduced by
following best practices. To underline our point that this
definition fits far to many security issues of the recent past,
we now take a brief look at three of them. Specifically, we
will take a look at the Equifax incident, Maersk being hit by
NotPetya, and Grindr exposing millions of users to potential
prosecution.
2.1 Equifax Compromise:
In mid-2017, Equifax—a US American credit rating
agency—announced that unknown attackers stole personal
data of over 143M American citizens and customers. The
stolen data contains critical personal information, includ-
ing social security numbers, credit card numbers, living
addresses etc. for nearly every person that conducted a
credit based financial transaction in the united states during
the last couple of years. This includes, for example, non-
residents that rented a hotel room using a credit card. [6]
Why was it preventable? The attackers exploited a vulnera-
bility in a component of the Apache Struts web-application
server Equifax uses to run its main application. However, a
patch for this vulnerability was already available [6], and
should have been installed. Yet, according to Equifax, a
single employee forgot to take the necessary actions [6].
The major issue here is that—as Equifax willfully
acknowledges—an employee was able to forget the update.
It is a well accepted best practice that the patch-level of IT
systems should be monitored, and the responsible employee
for upgrades notified by the monitoring system. In case
the employee does not react in time, the alert should be
escalated to ensure that the (critical) update takes place. This
was obviously not done at Equifax, even though the same
mechanic lead to countless incidents in the past [12]. Hence,
we consider this incident to be preventable.
2.2 Maersk
After the initial spread of ’NotPetya’—a potentially state
sponsored ransomware from the ’Petya’ family—the net-
work of Maersk was compromised. The infection vector
was most likely MeDoc, a tax handling software used in
Ukraine. Via the Kiev office, NotPetya spread in the Maersk
network, ultimately shutting down the company and caus-
ing between $200M and $300M in lost revenue. Maersk’s
recovery efforts took weeks, with major parts of their central
authentication system only being recoverable due to a single
out-station being offline—and therefore not infected—due
to a power failure [5].
Why was it preventable? The root cause of the initial
infection was a compromised auto-update feature, i.e., a
so called supply-chain-attack. In terms of defense this is
close to impossible to mitigate. However, the wider impact
of this incident was enabled by insufficient network seg-
mentation. Following best practices for security of (critical)
IT infrastructures, the Maersk network should have been at
least segmented and firewalled based on the national out-
stations, ideally on a per-department level. If this would
have been done, the incident would have only affected
Maersk Ukraine, and not the whole company.
Segmenting networks to stop the spread of worms (and
other malicious activity) is a long standing best practice. As
a community, we know this since the very first worm, the
Morris worm, in 1988, and have—since then—reiterated this
point tirelessly [13]. Yet, since then, countless companies fell
victim to generations of worms due to insufficient network
segmentation, with Maersk only being the newest victim in
a long line of organizations suffering from the same issue.
Hence, again, we can consider this incident as preventable.
2.3 Grindr
Grindr is a dating platform—while mostly being used by
men—for queer people to find and contact potential part-
ners in their vicinity. Due to the wide-spread discrimination
and criminalization of queer people around the world, it
should at least follow security best practices. In fact, weak
security of Grindr may actually threaten the lives of its
users in several jurisdictions. However, over the past years,
Grindr continuously proved that they are rather following a
naïve approach towards security.
The specific case we look at here is the security incident
that forced Grindr to actually implement passwords: In
2012, they were using the International Mobile Equipment
Identity (IMEI) of a users’ phone for authentication and
identification of close-by users. In short, a user would send
their IMEI to authenticate to the service, but also receive the
IMEIs of other users in the vicinity along with their profiles.
While this was hidden in the interface, the IMEIs were the
primary key for the App’s user-list feature. Made aware
of this problem, Grindr opted to implement a self-rolled
encryption layer to better hide this data from (malicious)
users. Unsurprisingly, two students from the University of
Amsterdam were able to break this self-rolled encryption
layer in 2013, and demonstrated how malicious users could
take over Grindr users’ accounts and read their private
messages [3].
Why was it preventable? In this case, Grindr failed twice.
First, they ignored the long standing practice of having at
least 1-factor authentication, which sounds absurd in times
of 2- and 3-factor authentication. Instead, they used (semi)
public information for authentication. To mitigate this issue,
Grindr opted to follow the two biggest fallacies in IT secu-
rity: Security by Obscurity in combination with self-rolled
Figure 1. A meme taken from https://security.meta.stackexchange.com/
a/915, a stackexchange thread collecting in-community memes on bad
security practices.
cryptography [3]. Notably, especially the latter is consider
an error so bold, that it made it into the programming
community’s strange humor, see Figure 1.
2.4 Skewed incentives and self-governance
What all our examples have in common is that the inci-
dent, at least in its scale, would have been preventable if
the affected company would have followed best practices.
Equifax should have not “forgotten” a security update,
Maersk should have segmented their network, and Grindr
should have used proper authentication methods from the
beginning. Yet, they did not follow best current practices
for building and operating IT systems, and the question is
‘why’?
To understand why best practices are often—
seemingly—ignored, we have to get a high-level view on
how risk management is usually done. Risks are usually
classified by their probability, i.e., how likely they occur,
and their impact, i.e., how bad things get if the risk materi-
alizes. Based on this classification, an organization can then
decide what amount of resources it considers appropriate to
mitigate the risk.
IT security has a problem on both sides of this equa-
tion. First, security, as practiced in IT operations, is often
understood as an absence of errors. This means that the
return-on-investment is close to impossible to measure; in
the best case, simply nothing happens. However, this also
means that the absence of security incidents due to random
chance cannot be distinguished from an absence due to a
securely build and operated system. Second, the impact of
security incidents is often negligible. Lange & Burger found
a re-bound effect in stock prices of companies suffering from
a security incident leaking user data. In short, after an initial
shock reaction, the companies value estimate will approach
its valuation before the incident [9]. Hence, it is naturally
difficult to argue for any—usually costly—investment in IT
security, given a low (perceived) event probability and a
(perceived) unlikely loss due to the risk manifesting.
Looking at security incidents when end-users are af-
fected, we find an interesting reasons for why there was
no large monetary impact, and therefore no incentive for
change. In case of Equifax, the simple reason is that no
data of Equifax customers was lost. Equifax’ main revenue
stream comes from credit rating services provided to banks,
Mobile network operators, and other companies needing
insights into end-users’ credit score. These companies are
Equifax’ direct customers. However, the data Equifax lost
is that of end-users. Hence, end-users could only execute
pressure on Equifax, i.e., vote with their feet, if they would
(collectively) avoid signing contracts with companies using
Equifax’ services. Given the power-imbalance in the market,
this boils down to the question of ‘What do I value more: A
new smartphone with my mobile contract, or my privacy?’
Considering users are willing to give up their passwords for
some chocolate, this is mostly a rhetorical question [11].
If we extend this observation to the Grindr case, we
find the stakes to be significantly higher. Not only a user’s
privacy, but depending on the jurisdiction, their life is at
stake. Yet, this is just pulling the above example a little
further. While in the previous example, the need was a
simple function of social status, here we are talking about
the opportunity of finding a partner. In many, if not most,
jurisdictions that discriminate against queer people, Grindr
and similar apps may be the only way to do so. So, like
before, where the trade-off was ‘status vs. privacy’, it is now
‘love vs. life.’
In contrast to the former two cases, Maersk obviously
sticks out. While Grindr and Equifax clearly affected end-
users, the biggest impact the Maersk incident had on their
customers was that they were unable to bill them for the
transport services they were providing. In this case, the
company suffering from the security incident also directly
incurred a net loss. However, we can assume that Maersk
now takes following good security practices seriously. This
is supported by research of Dietrich et al., who found
that organizations suffering from a security incident will
improve their security posture [2].
So, in summary, we find that the incentive structure
for IT security, especially when it comes to a large end-
user base, is skewed. End-user behavior and post-incident
damages do not necessarily tip the scales in terms of risk
management. Cases where there is a clear and measurable
impact of security incidents in terms of revenue loss are
surprisingly rare, but usually lead to an improvement in
an organization’s security posture [2]. Hence, any approach
to governing IT security should attempt to level the risk
management field.
3 A SHORT HISTORY OF AVIATION SAFETY
In this section, we will explore how aviation safety devel-
oped over time—and how it was not so different than IT’s
current culture.
3.1 Semantics of Safety
When we talk about aviation safety in comparison to com-
puter security, we must understand that ‘safe’ and ‘secure’
do not have the same meaning in aviation. We—as IT
engineers—usually think about security as the three basic
properties we have to protect against an adversarial attacker.
Yet, in aviation, safety means that a system continues to
operate even in the presence of error, no matter if this error
is intentional or not. Their notion of ‘security’ very much
follows the same idea as ours, as IT engineers: Systems
have to be secure against tampering, by unauthorized or
malicious personnel and external actors. However, they also
have to be safe.
3.2 Early Aviation Safety
The early history of aviation safety and security is sur-
prisingly similar to the current state of computer security.
Specifically, aviation was an unregulated field of pioneers.
As such, safety was not a core concern. This changed with
aviation becoming more and more prominent [7]. By now,
aviation safety is one of the most strongly regulated [1],
but also least error-prone fields of large system operations.
With aviation safety continuously improving over the last
decades [1], it is obvious that the mechanisms and policies
to avoid preventable errors have been successful.
Following Heppenheimer, the notable governance ac-
tions that lead to a significant improvement in aviation
safety too place between 1945 and 1965 [7]: After the sec-
ond world war, civil aviation for personal travel gained
significant traction. However, safety had not yet reached
today’s standards: There were no procedures to analyze
safety incidents, no rule-book that would ensure that errors
only happen once. As such, avoidable incidents tended to
reoccur [14]. In the next twenty years, several (global) policy
decisions lead to the observed increase in safety, while the
overall volume of aviation increased dramatically as well.
3.3 Public post-mortems
In the absence of pre-known best-practices to build on, avia-
tion reached Today’s safety levels mostly due to public and
reactive post-mortems. Reactive post-mortems, i.e., conduct-
ing a post-mortem to identify root-causes and then putting
policies in place that prevent future similar incidents, are
best illustrated by their history in aviation safety. Hep-
penheimer reports on a case from 1960, where two planes
collided over Brooklyn which mirrored the conditions of
a similar incident four years earlier. An investigation later
concluded that the incident was avoidable [7].
However, as Heppenheimer notes, the most interesting
thing about the 1960 incident was not what it changed, but
what it re-affirmed: That, in general, the incident was avoid-
able. However, this time around, the FAA (Federal Aviation
Administration) conducted a thorough and public root-cause
analysis, deriving, mandating, and publishing rules for those
actions that would have prevented the incident [7]. The
change to this methodology—deriving rules from a public
root-cause analysis and mandating their adoption—lead to
a constant increase in aviation safety. By 1989, aviation
safety rose to a level where an avoided collision with two
planes passing in a distance of two miles was considered as
critical of an incident as the collision of two planes in 1960,
triggering the same level of post-mortem analysis [7].
Note, however, that reactive post-mortems are detached
from the actual mechanisms that have to be implemented.
While technical aspects, like check-lists, or standardization
of procedures across actors, may also be adoptable to the
computer security domain, we are focusing on the un-
derlying governance approach: Conducting a public root-
cause analysis, and mandating the adoption of preventive
measures.
3.4 Impact of Incidents
On a first look, the severity of incidents is fundamentally
different between computer security and aviation safety.
While faults in flight safety and security can lead to the
death of passengers, issues in information security are often
considered “merely” privacy issues—which they are not, as
the Grindr case-study demonstrates.
However, not only since the IoT, safety and security
in computer systems has been known to affect the lives
of people. One of the first, and probably most prominent
computer safety incident leading to the death of people
occurred in the early 1980’s. A programming mistake in
the control software of x-ray machines of a certain vendor
lead to the death of several patients due to radiation over-
exposure. Today, computer systems control large (chemical)
plants, medical systems, and other crucial aspects of human
live. For example, tampering with traffic-lights may lead
to the road-death of countless people. Hence, while it may
seem like there is a huge difference in the possible impact
of computer security and aviation safety, this is not the
case. Instead, the difference in potential impact is mostly
a perception issue.
3.5 Policy Enforcement
In aviation safety, two major incentives/mechanisms that
ensure the adoption of flight safety measures: (i) The peo-
ple affected by incidents (passengers) are also the direct
customers of the airlines, and the threat of a plane falling
to the ground is not as abstract as for computer security,
see Section 2. Hence, flight operators have a monetary
incentive of increasing flight-safety. (ii) There is an easy way
of punishing policy violators by retracting landing rights. In
fact, one of the most effective means of enforcing aviation
safety is a global blacklist of known best-practice violators.
In computer security, the impact of incidents is often
abstract, and the affected users are not necessarily a com-
panies’ ‘customers.’ Furthermore, due to the global nature
of the Internet, it is not as easy to effectively punish or-
ganizations that do not adopt best practices. The FAA can
prevent an airline with bad safety practices from landing
at any US airport, thereby cutting them off the US market.
In comparison, it is hardly possible to prevent Europeans
from accessing a social network service located outside of
Europe if said service operator neglects computer security
best practices.
3.6 Public Authority
With the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
and International Air Transport Association (IATA), there
are two international umbrella organization for flight safety
and security with strong regulatory impact. Commonly,
there is a local government organization responsible for
aviation safety, e.g., the FAA in the United States, and there
is a clear chain of responsibility for investigating aviation
safety incidents.
In contrast, there is no clear global and coordinated
governance of computer security. International standards
organizations, like the IETF or ITU build Internet protocols,
not focusing on concurrent events and incidents. While—by
now—local CSIRTs (For example the US-CERT in the United
States) exist in almost all countries, they are not coupled
with a strong reporting requirement for incidents involving
actors from a specific country. However, these reporting re-
quirements would be necessary due to the reduced visibility
of many computer security incidents in comparison with
aviation safety incidents. Similarly, CSIRTs commonly do
not hold investigative power to become active in case of
an unreported incident.
Additionally, authority over incidents on the Internet
cannot be easily defined. In aviation safety, the responsibil-
ity for investigating an incident lies with the country where
the plane came down/where the incident happened. If this
country is unable to perform a sufficient investigation, e.g.,
as in the case of MH17, this can be delegated to another
country connected to the flight, i.e., the origin/destination
country, or, the country the airline operating the plane has
its seat in.
If we connect something to the Internet, it is basically
everywhere. In fact, we find that in areas where we do
have some form of location based regulatory relevance,
e.g., concerning data privacy laws or when it comes to
taxing technology companies, actors try to “select” certain
countries with a less stringent governance body or more
lenient legislation. For example, Facebook opted to have a
European subsidiary in Ireland, so that the more relaxed
data security regulations of Ireland are applicable for all
European users.
4 LESSONS FROM AVIATION
So, what can we learn from aviation safety for IT secu-
rity? How should we change and adjust our governance
approach, and how can we make IT systems (more) safe? We
recommend five key items, regulators and engineers should
consider to improve the global security of IT systems.
4.1 Including safety in threat models
The first, relatively simple thing, that has to change is
the role of error in our threat models. In fact, we claim
that in addition to having threat models, we should start
to develop safety models for IT systems and applications.
These should, in absence of an attacker, assess how we risk
failure in systems in the presence of (un)intentional errors,
and—along the mitigations in threat-modelling—how we
can mitigate these risks. Hence, an error is not only ‘a bug’
but an as serious incident as an attacker compromising a
system in our world. While changing this paradigm might
not be hard on a technical level—every IT engineer should
already be able to build a safety model—it certainly requires
significant effort in teaching, education, and awareness.
4.2 Clean-slate Best Practices
The field of IT is full of books, reports, blog-articles, and
standards describing how things should be done. There
are industry wide standards (ISO2700X, Common Criteria),
and most recently, the GDPR should force organizations to
adopt best practices. In practice, however, we find that even
operators that are ISO/2700X certified, do still suffer from
simple and avoidable mistakes. For instance, Equifax, the
main culprit in one of the most sever data leaks of the past
years, claims to be ISO/27001 certified.
There seems to be something wrong with how we cur-
rently handle best practices. However, looking at research
by Dietrich et al. [2] on IT operations and earlier work by
Hopkins on safety in hazardous industries [8] shows that
there can also be too many processes, procedures, standards,
and best practices. This also played a crucial role in the case
of Equifax. All the things they might have done better aside,
given their certifications it is not unlikely that they assumed
they were already doing enough. The crucial item they
missed—a consistent and properly escalating monitoring
system for security updates—might just have fallen through
the cracks. As such, the case of Equifax is exemplary for the
state in which we currently are in terms of IT operations and
computer security: There are too many, partly overlapping,
partly disagreeing standards, certificates, procedures, and
recommendations.
Hence, we suggest to simply start from scratch. Instead
of trying to condense the current abundance of best practices
into a prescriptive view on security, we create a descriptive
view on security by investigating incidents as they come
along, mandating behavior that would have prevented the
incident. The specific form of the recommendations, i.e.,
whether it is adding checklists to procedures, mandating a
strict four-eyes policy for critical procedures, etc. should be
considered based on the specific issues, and should be left
open for later corrections. One might argue, that our choice
of a clean-slate for best-practices is somewhat naïve. There
already exists a plethora of recommendations, best practices,
standards, and suggestions on how to properly run an IT
system. It would take too long to find a widely accepted
common view on what and which of these should be in-
cluded in an authoritative best-practices repository. Hence,
we claim that it will most likely be faster to just start from
scratch. After all, this is how aviation became safe, even
though some of the lessons learned are—in retrospect—
obvious, like ‘pilots should not be drunk.’
4.3 Open Incident Investigations
To enable our clean-slate best practices approach, we must
be able to investigate and learn from incidents. Hence, as in
aviation safety, post-mortems should be open and public.
On its own, this recommendation sounds simple. Natu-
rally, there already have been regulatory attempts towards
this in the past. Within the EU, several countries adopted
policies that require companies to report security incidents,
even before the GDPR. Likewise, the DHS and US-CERT
established a mandatory incident reporting procedure1.
However, research by Laube & Böhme shows that there
1. https://www.us-cert.gov/incident-notification-guidelines
are insufficient incentives for companies to participate [10],
and, more importantly, these programs usually do not entail
a public database of incidents and recommendations. Fur-
thermore, as in other fields [4], it is generally difficult what
constitutes an incident worthy of reporting. Not every SSH
brute-force attack should go through a full incident review.
At the moment, some organizations, for example
GitHub2 already implement a public error culture. However,
research by Dietrich et al. observes that many companies do
not sufficiently budget for errors to enable blameless post-
mortems [2]. Hence, open incident investigations are not an
isolated process. They are a necessary steps for a clean-slate
best practices repository, and they have to be implemented
in conjunction with the right incentive models and proper
delegation of regulatory control.
If we tie this back to the Maersk case from Section 2, we
see what public value could have been gained by a public in-
cident investigation. With its unsegmented network Maersk
does not stand alone among Enterprises. In addition, due
to having to build their whole system from scratch, it is
likely that Maersk now took a more segmented approach.
However, lessons learned from this process are not available
to the wider public. Naturally, one might argue that Maersk
paid a lot for these insights, and therefore should retain
them for themselves. Yet, in aviation, letting everyone learn
from a single actors mistake was crucial for developing
today’s safety levels.
4.4 Delegating Regulatory Authority
Properly delegating the regulatory control is important
when adopting a security and safety system modeled after
the aviation industry. In aviation, the ICAO (International
Civil Aviation Organization) and the IATA (International
Air Transport Association), are a public organization of
aviation companies (IATA), and a United Nations backed
governance body (ICAO). Below that, we have the na-
tional organizations (like the FAA) and companies itself. For
the purpose of aviation, especially given their significantly
lower frequency of incidents, this is a reasonable setup.
However, in computer security, we face a significantly
higher number of incidents to be investigated, which means
that our governance tree cannot be as flat. In addition,
there is not the industry organization, or a comparable
international governance body for computer security which
could serve as an umbrella organization. Hence, we face two
distinct problems, or rather flows, of regulatory authority: (i)
The top-level governance, which concerns mostly building
the best practices repository, and overseeing the global com-
pliance of the lower levels, and, (ii) The lower levels of in-
cident investigation, and handling best-practices violations.
Furthermore, we have the issue of who is responsible for
handling an incident. As outlined in Section 3, responsibility
in aviation is usually rather clear: The organization from the
country where the incident happened, e.g., where the plane
hit the ground, is responsible.
In general, we already have an active CSIRT commu-
nity in most countries, which could pick up these tasks.
However, at the moment their key-focus is on dealing with
incidents itself, after they occur, and providing support
2. See https://github.blog/2018-10-30-oct21-post-incident-analysis/.
in adhering to existing security best practices. Instead, to
compare to aviation safety bodies, CSIRTs would have to
have the mandate to: (i) Investigating computer security
incidents, with a legal backing to do a full root-cause
analysis, (ii) Identify actions that would have prevented the
incident at hand, and communicate that upstream, and, (iii)
Being able to trigger sufficient action in case of best practice
violations, i.e., fines. Adjusting (national) CSIRTs rights and
obligations, to leverage these existing structures would be
essential in realizing our proposal. Ultimately, the most
important aspect is that this structure has to have the form of
a tree, where investigations can be distributed, while results
are communicated towards the root, and the root caters
for the clean-slate best practices repository outlined above.
Hence, in summary, we suggest to delegate regulatory con-
trol bottom-up, i.e., starting with national regulations that
delegate clear responsibilities for incident post-mortems to
responsible and capable actors. These then should also have
the authority and responsibility to investigate IT security
incidents in their jurisdiction, including applying fines.
At the same time, we have to build an international
organization as the root of this ‘tree’ of CSIRTs, to serve
as the ultimate ‘guardian’ of the best practices repository.
The obvious solution to the first item would be reusing one
of the international standards organizations—the ITU, the
IETF, or maybe ISO—for this purpose. However, while it
might not appear as easy, given these organizations track-
record in finding consensus, it might be best to extend the
clean-slate approach to this aspect, and create a dedicated
body under the UN, as with ICAO.
At this stage, our proposal leaves the issue of who will
ultimately be responsible for investigating an incident. We
suggest, that based on the severity of incidents, authority
may remain in an organization, or the incident may have
to be handled by a specific sector CSIRT. The tree-shaped
structure also allows us to create a responsibility structure
that ensures global actors can no longer hide behind na-
tional governance inconsistencies. In case of an incident
spanning multiple countries, sectors, or organizations, the
most covering node in the tree, becomes responsible for
handling the incident. For example, in case of a company
active in several sectors within multiple countries in the
European Union, ENISA, the European Union Agency for
Cybersecurity, would be responsible. If an incident would
involve countries outside of the European Union, or if the
affected organization contests the investigation by ENISA,
the international ICAO equivalent we suggest would have
to take charge. Similarly, an organization mainly active in
the Netherlands’ farming sector would be handled by the
Dutch CSIRT for the producing sector, while they could ask
for the case to be deferred to the Dutch NCSC.
4.5 Creating Incentives for Secure Operations
The most important governance change we suggest pertains
incentives for following known best practices. In Section 2,
we already discuss how—in computer security—the incen-
tive structure for proper behavior is skewed. To address
this issue, the GDPR already suggest fines of up to 4% of
an organization’s annual revenue for serious data breaches.
However, we suggest to adjust this gradually, not only based
on the severity and impact of an incident, but also based on
whether it was preventable (as discussed in Section 2) if the
affected company would have followed the best-practices
in-place at that time. In fact, to facilitate a post-mortem
culture driven by openness, and not fear, we suggest to
not fine organizations suffering from a data-breach due to
an oversight not covered by codified best practices. Instead,
those first incidents should always lead to an update of these
best practices. Organizations, however, that do suffer from a
data-breach due to violating best practices—maybe with an
initial grace period after setting this policy in place—should
be fined for, e.g., a minor fraction of their annual revenue.
This value should be doubled for any further incident due
to a best-practices violation by the same organization. The
benefit of this slowly increasing fine-structure is that it
neither punishes first-time offenders overly harsh, thereby
not suffocating innovation, but at the same time puts a clear
and measurable monetary incentive on repeated offenders,
tipping the risk-equation in favor of computer security.
When we tie this back to the Grindr case discussed
in Section 2. Grindr, in itself, is an important tool within
the Queer community. This also explains why users are so
unlikely to leave the service (see Section 2 for a discussion
on the need-incentive issues users face.) While their first
error is bad, immediately hitting the company with a 4%
annual revenue fine might have put them out-of-business.
At the same time, the actual turn of events—no fines at all—
did not lead to them considering their computer security
and users’ privacy more seriously. In fact, Grindr managed
to become a press matter for security and privacy viola-
tions nearly every single year since 2012, with them, most
recently, leaking their users’ HIV status. A progressively
increasing fine-structure, in this case, would have ensured
that the company gets a clear monetary incentive to behave
securely, while not inhibiting the development of new and
innovative platforms.
5 CONCLUSION
In this article, we suggest five mechanics available to policy
makers to globally improve the state of computer security.
We suggest to adopt the safety-paradigm from aviation,
along with their procedure of conducting public incident
investigations, and creating codified best practices from
these investigations. However, we also find that two other
aspects—regulatory control and inherent incentives for safe
and secure behavior—are not directly adoptable. There are
too many security incidents in computer security to adopt
a similarly flat governance structure as in aviation, and the
incentive system in terms of computer security is skewed
towards inaction. In fact, it might just be cheaper for compa-
nies to not follow security best practices. Hence, we suggest
leveraging existing incident handling structures and com-
munities in conjunction with a global umbrella organization
modeled after the structure found in aviation to ensure
global policy alignment. This structure can then also be
used to enforce globally comparable fine-based incentives
for secure behavior.
Next steps: In this paper, we present a vision of what
might improve IT security, based on the aviation sector’s
experiences. To realize our proposal in the future, we will
have to conduct further research on the applicability of
our recommendations. Specifically, we must understand—
experiences from other fields aside—how open incident
investigations may improve IT security. Similarly, we have
to understand how companies would react to the proposed
fine based incentive model. However, as our recommenda-
tions are interdependent, the ultimate test of whether they
work will be implementing them together. We note that this
will require a significant international collaboration effort.
Hence, in the end, the question is ‘How much do we value
secure and dependable IT systems?’
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